Yelda Demirag (Ankara)
Pan-Ideologies in the Ottoman Empire against the West: From Pan-Ottomanism to Pan-Turkism
Even as the lands of the Ottoman Empire contained one third of Europe, it was not accepted as a European power, because of the religious affiliation which differed it from the others in Europe.[1] In fact, the Ottomans had no wish towards being recognized as such for they considered the Empire as superior to the other states of the continent. To be considered as equal and to establish diplomatic relations on equal basis with the West was undesirable for the Ottomans. In this context, the ambassadors were accepted to Istanbul, but no ambassador was sent abroad on a permanent basis, since it is not accepted by the Ottoman sultans that they were equal to their European counterparts in the agreements they concluded. The letter sent by Suleyman the Magnificent to his ally French King François I is a good example of this.[2]
Until the Carlowitz Treaty which constitutes a turning point for the Empire, the Ottoman relations with the Western states were handled in such a manner. 1699 is the year that the decline of the Empire began and that the Ottomans understood their current political, military, and economic positions were not good as those of Europe, and began to attempt at solving these problems. Beginning with that time, the Ottoman bureaucracy started to search for the meaning of being European in political and social terms. The most important question was what should be done in order to save the Empire. It was thought that the decline might be stopped by adopting the military techniques of the West which managed to beat the Ottoman army which was thought once unbeatable. The ambassadors sent to the West during the 18th century focused mainly on this issue. For instance, Ahmet Resmi Efendi who was sent to Prussia in 1763 mentioned with commendation the discipline of the Prussian Army in his Sefaretname (Consulate Reports)[3] As Lewis states that the Ottomans have not adopted the new military technologies was not because they were unaware of the developments, but because of the troubles that the Ottoman economy faced[4] as they had previously adopted such technologies. As the value of the Ottoman currency devalued while the prices of the raw material imported from Europe rose, some modern developments in the military industry could not be traced, and that served to the decline of the Ottoman army against the West.[5] In the meantime, another point the Ottomans missed were the developments that were at the foundation of the technical developments in the West. The scientific developments had begun in Europe at the 14th and 15th centuries including the Renaissance, and from the 17th century these theoretical developments were applied to technology.[6] During the reigns of Selim III and Mahmut II, it was understood that the Western supremacy was not limited to the technical field and the reforms were widened to include diplomacy and education.[7] As it was understood that these were not enough by themselves, then, the judicial system was revised. However, these efforts neither prevented the decline of the Empire nor provided a sound base for identity in its communities. Instead, the reforms destroyed the traditional order, but never replaced them with a new and workable one. Under these circumstances, the 19th century witnessed many debates among the Ottoman intelligentsia for the political orientation of the Empire.[8] This paper will focus on these debates namely; Pan-Ottomanism, Pan-Islamism, Pan-Turkism and Westernism. The main aim of these ideologies was common; to save the Empire from collapse, however there was no strict distinction between them. The paper will also try to analyze the impact of these ideologies on Modern Turkey in the conclusion.
Until the end of the 19th century, Ottomans had no “ethnic policy” nor did they value the idea of being Turks till that time. Although it was based on a theocratic structure from the beginning, the Ottoman State has given its minorities the chance to preserve their ethnic and religious identities in peace[9] within the Ottoman “millet sistemi”[10]. Although the primary reason for the Ottomans to adopt such a system was Islamic law, the changes in economic and administrative conditions were of great importance too. The change in the trade routes after the European discoveries of the 15th century affected the economic life of the Near East negatively and the Ottomans had to adopt new precautions to revive the trade activities in the region. Especially during the reign of Mehmet II, Venetians and Genoese practicing trade had been given extensive rights and non-Muslims who accepted Ottoman rule were given the rights of free belief. Again in this period, the Greek Orthodox Patriarchy was revived and further religious and legal rights were awarded to the Patriarchy than it was given in the Byzantine period. In the same way, the Jews were given the right to keep their own synagogues, and the Armenians were appointed a patriarch and hence the balance between the different communities was kept.[11] Each faith was set free to establish an order according to its own beliefs. In fact, the strengthening of the religious and then their ethnic identities which turned into their modern political identities for the minorities living in the Empire were experienced under the millet system which stayed in practice for 400 years.[12] This bending rule of the Ottomans which helped minorities preserve their identities was a helping factor in the fact that the nationalist movements managed to find niches in the Empire in the wake of the ideas of “everyone was created equal” in America and “human and citizen rights” in France during the late 18th century. The zımmis (non-Muslim subjects) who benefited from their links with the West as well as their immunity from military service confronted the Empire with secessionist demands.[13] The European powers that were not late to make use of these demands of the non-Muslims adopted the protection of the minorities, and began to make pressure the Empire for reforms to benefit the zımmis. As a result of the emergence of nationalistic ideas among the Ottoman communities and the support given to them by the Great powers in the early 19th century the Ottoman Empire had to accept the independence of Greece, the autonomy of the Wallachia and Bogdan and Serbia. In this century, reform movements began to stop the disturbances in the Empire on the one hand and to avoid the interventions of the Great powers on the other. The statesmen of the Tanzimat era aimed at both achieving Westernization and uniting those living within the Empire around the spirit of Ottomanism and keep the state intact. The birth of the thoughts on the creation of an Ottoman identity and then an Ottoman nationality among all ethnic groups within the Ottoman Empire as to have the Ottoman communities to act in accordance with the benefits of the Empire, is also marked in this era.
Pan-Ottomanism
Pan-Ottomanism aimed to provide all the millets with a new identity that could save the Empire from collapse. The main idea was the principle of ittihad-ı anasır (the unity of components) taking each millet as an equal part of a greater Ottoman nation. It was based on two main assumptions: First; the non-Muslim subjects of the Empire could no longer be gathered under the umbrella of the ancient regime allowing a dominant position to Muslims. Second; introducing more Islamic or nationalist policies was more divisive approach, which would lead to further secessionist demands.[14] In fact, the idea of creating an Ottoman nation harks back to the words of Mahmut II who stated “I identify my Muslim subjects in the mosque, Christian subjects in the church and my Jewish subjects at the synagogue. There is no difference between them. For all my justice is equal and all of them are my true children.”[15] The 1839 Gülhane Hattı Hümayunu accepted his arguments by defending the equality of all Ottoman subjects before the law regardless of their religious beliefs.[16] However, the Tanzimat reforms failed to prevent the rise of secessionist ideas among the non-Muslim subjects within the Empire and besides it has attracted reactions from the Muslims for being equal to non-Muslims.[17] Another opposition group against the Tanzimat reforms was within the reformers themselves. This group named as the “Young Ottomans” claimed that the 1839 (Gülhane Hatt-ı) and 1856 (Islahat) decrees were documents invigorating imperialism and that Ali and Fuat Pashas were the men of the West due to their economic policies. According to the Young Ottomans, the Tanzimat could not go beyond being a cultural imitation, and has shaken the Muslim community fundamentally. According to such representatives of the group like Şinasi and Namık Kemal, the solution laid in the establishment of a representative, constitutional, and parliamentary administration and hence in the creation of a full loyalty in all subjects of the empire, Muslim or non-Muslim.[18] Namık Kemal wanted a contuniation of the mixture that made up the Ottoman Empire and defended the idea of Ottomanism which stated that as each group cannot be a state in itself, all should be loyal and connected to the Ottoman Empire. In that sense, the Young Ottomans who criticized the statesmen of Tanzimat for imitating the West were also taking the West as their example. They hoped that if the Empire was furnished with more liberal institutions and if there was equality of citizenship before the laws for all the subjects, then it would be possible to save the country from collapse quickly and preserve its unity and integrity in the long run.[19] Although the Young Ottomans differed from Ali and Fuad Pasha on many issues, there were two common points between them: The attempts to save the Empire and to create a concept of Ottomanism to make nationalism fade into the background.[20] As stated above, when one analyses the constitutionalism defended by the Young Ottomans, it is clearly seen that it aims at limiting the sultan’s capabilities but another issue is to prevent any further dismemberment within the empire by establishing a system in which all are equal under a parliamentarian system. Despite all these attempts, it will be understood in a while that the idea of Ottomanism was not accepted among the minorities of the Empire, because nationalism is grounded, and beside Muslims saw the idea of the equality of all citizens as an unacceptable phenomenon. With the loss of some Thracian lands of the Empire after the Ottoman-Russian War in 1877-78, the Arabic and Muslim elements were now becoming more important in the Empire in comparison with the past. It is from that time onwards that the idea of replacing Ottomanism with Muslimness began to gather strength.
Pan-Islamism
During the reign of Abdülhamit II, the ideology of Muslim unity, Pan-Islamism, grew in importance. In fact, Islamism and being against the West were discussed before Abdülhamit II came into power, what he did was to adopt it as an official ideology. Islamists believed that the main cause of the decline was the denial of the basic teachings and values of Islam. It aimed to keep all Muslim people united politically, through giving them a sense of Islamic socio-political identity.[21] The Panislamism of Abdülhamit can be seen as a counter-thesis against the pan-ideologies that emerged in the West, a means of defense in the times when imperialism gathered strength.[22] In other words, the ideology of Pan-Islamism emerged as a reaction to the nationalist, rationalist and positivist ideas of Western civilization and to the expansionist nature of all kinds of imperialism.[23] Anti-Westernism during the reign of Abdülhamit II has caused the ideas that the Western culture is negative and harmful, and gave traditional values and ideas a boost, yet, all in all, Western technology was also used, Modern Turkish literature was shaped in that era, military schools that the Union and Progress ranks would graduate from were established at that period. The separation of Muslim Albanians and the secessionist views amongst the Arabs led to the strengthening of ideas that promoted Turkish identity.
Occidentalism
Occidentalism that was seen as a must in the Ottoman Empire is not peculiar to the Second Constitutional era. As mentioned above, from the period that the Empire began to lose ground against the West in economic, political and military areas, attempts to prevent the decline were made by adopting the Western techniques, educational institutions, and legal system. Although during the reign of Abdülhamid II, pro-Western movement which declined in face of anti-Western attitudes it still continued in technical field. The Port Arthur victory of the Japans in 1905 against Russia was seen differently by different groups of thought. The pro-Western people linked the Japanese victory against a European power to its Westernization efforts, the traditionalists have seen the victory related to Japanese adoption of Western technology without losing their identity.[24] However, that the idea of Westernization becomes systemic and is seen as the primary problem of the nation is from 1908 onwards.[25] The main supporters of Westernization managed to make their voices heard at Abdullah Cevdet’s journal İçtihad. Their main point was that the Western superiority had an unquestionable basis which was science, and there was no logic in confronting it. However, they can be analyzed in two groups. According to the moderate modernizers, technique may be transferred from one country to another but civilization could not.[26] Those moderate modernizers as Celal Nuri (İleri), advocated that what is good for the society’s development should be taken from the West and developed within the traditional values, and accused Tanzimat reformers to blindly imitating Europe. On the other hand, for extreme Westernizers, the solution was more, not less, Westernization. At this point, they were criticizing the reformers before them for not going as far as necessary. For the latter, Westernization is not an issue of choice, but a matter of survival. Abdullah Cevdet states on the subject “There is no alternative civilization; civilization means European civilization; and we have to accept it with roses and its thorns”[27]. Westernization is again another thesis developed by Ottoman intelligentsia in order to save the Empire. Ottoman intellectuals have seen the West as a power and Westernization as strengthening.
Pan-Turkism
The emergence of Turkish nationalism is far later than its western counterpart. It is due to the fact that the Turks were the owners of the empire; thus if Turks came up with the idea of Turkish nationalism, this might have constituted an example to the others. Another and possibly more important reason is the creation of bourgeois and labor classes in other nations before the Turks.[28] The start of the Turkish nationalism as a concept owes to the Turcology studies in the 19th century Europe.[29] This field of science informed Turks on their Asiatic roots, provided information on their bright past before their conversion to Islam, and emphasized the language links among them. It could not be expected that the works of European Turcologists would not affect Ottoman intellectuals who were in an ideological vacuum and who tried to find a solution to the decline. A channel these ideas reached Turks living in the Empire was the student corps sent to Europe for education. Another channel of communication was the Hungarian exiles who settled in the Empire after the 1848 revolutions. This effect has shaped during the rule of Abdulhamit II despite censoring.
Another source which affected the Turkist current in the Ottoman Empire was the Turks in Russia. Among the Muslims of Russia, especially among the Tartars of Volga, the idea of nationalism arose before the Turks of the Empire.[30] When the reasons for that are considered in terms of economic and cultural perspectives, it is understood that the Volga Tartars were the most advanced amongst the Muslims of Russia. Despite suffering from the Russian pressure in the centuries which followed the invasion, with the rise of Catherina II to power, the balances have changed and the Tartars were granted a kind of religious and civil autonomy. More importantly, they became intermediaries in the trade between the rich Central Asian markets and the West that the Russian failed to penetrate due to religious differences. This advantage gave way to the rise of a rich traders’ class among the Tatar community.[31] On the other hand, when we look at the Turks living in the Empire, we can see that they do not have a special place within the millet system of the Empire and that they constituted the dominant millet with the other Muslims of the Empire (Arabs, Kurds, Albanians), that there were no ethnic barriers between them, and that the Ottoman Turks have adopted Islamic culture in full.[32] The main sign for this is the answer to the question of how they saw their own culture traditionally. Ottoman historiography rose basically on two issues: the role assumed by Muhammed the Prophet, and the rise of the Ottoman dynasty. The link between these two issues was provided by the Seljuks.[33] In other words, the pre-Islamic past of the Turks, their Asian roots were forgotten. For this reason, while there were effects of nationalism among other nations of the Empire, such as the Greek independence and Serbian autonomy, no signs of Turkish-Ottoman consciousness emerged. During the last quarter of the 19th century, to oppose the strengthening Pan-Slavist movement of Alexander III and the Russification movement, reforms were undertaken by the Tatar community. The Tatars who understood there was a need for another sort of imperialism to counter the Russian imperialism, saw the solution in the unification of all Muslim Turks.[34] After the seizure of Crimea by the Russians, a big Tatar migration took place toward Ottoman Empire and this migration continued in great waves after the Ottoman-Russian War in 1877-1878, locating a large number of Tatars, Azerbaijanis, and Caucasian Turks to the Empire. By the end of the same century, improvements in railroad making, an increase in naval transport, made the Turk in Russia become closer to both themselves and the Ottoman Empire. With the development of the means of communication and with the influence of Turkish intellectuals who had to give a fight of identity against the repressive Russian regime and who fled to Ottoman Empire, Panturkism began to find supporters among the Turks of the Ottoman Empire, too.
The major advocate of Panturkist ideology among Turks in Russia was İsmail Gaspıralı (1851-1914), a Crimean Tatar. Gaspıralı, stated his idea of unity among Russian Muslims and Turks with the motto of his Crimean newspaper Tercüman, “unity in language, ideas, deeds”.[35] His relative and Kazan Tartar Yusuf Akçura / Akçuraoğlu[36] (1876-1935), was comparing the three political approaches pursued by the Union and Progress Party (UP) and was calling for a unification of Turks who were facing the Western imperialism in his 1904 article “Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset” (Three Ways of Policy) which was considered as the manifesto of Panturkism, published in the journal “Turk”.[37]
Ottomanism, Islamism and Turkism were seen in different intervals as the ideology of Union and Progress in the period 1908-1918. As stated above, the idea of Ottomanism was put forward by intellectuals and the government since the Tanzimat. The Union and Progress valued this idea since it was established as a secret society in Thessaloniki. It was seen as the most intelligent idea to save and develop a multinational state. Until the Balkan War the policy of “İttihad-ı Anasır” (the unity of constituents) remained the dominant policy in terms of its main framework. The 1913 Balkan War was the turning point of the “İttihad-ı Anasır” policy. From the war onwards, the Turkist movement which became popular after 1908 Revolution[38] changed the way the Turks were seen as “Etrak-ı bi İdrak” (unintelligent Turks). The continuous attempts of Great Powers to protect the minorities caused the young intellectuals to adopt Turkish nationalism vigorously. A coherent effort combining different aspects of the Ottoman State and Western style modernization came from Durkheim’s follower Ziya Gökalp.[39] He has attempted to develop these ideas a short while after the Young Turc Revolution in the articles he wrote for the journal Türk Yurdu[40] published by the Türk Derneği Örgütü[41] (Turkish Association Organization) led by Yusuf Akçura[42]. Turkish nationalism formulated by Ziya Gökalp, has become the dominant ideology especially after the Balkan War, and has gained an economic dimension within this framework. The economic dimension of Turkish nationalism emerges with the UP’s “National Economy Program”. This program may be described as aiming at discharging the minority or foreign tradesmen, bankers, entrepreneurs, and replacing them with Turks, that is creating a Turkish bourgeoisie.
By 1914 the most dominant ideology in the Empire was Panturkism. The advocates of this ideology started to affect the public opinion and foreign policy with their articles. As can be seen in the articles of Yusuf Akçura, alliance with Germany was supported. Anti-Russian strategies were mentioned and Russia was presented as the greatest obstacle staying in front of Turkish unity. Where would Ottoman Empire take its place within the new system of alliances of Europe? When France, the traditional ally of the Empire allied with Russia, the Panturkist perspective eliminated this country at once. As for Britain, although the Britain has defended the Ottoman unity through the 19th century, Ottomans knew it was for securing the British route to India. Thus, these observations of Panturkists led them to alliance with Germany. One can see these considerations in the secret treaty concluded with Germany one day before the Russian declaration of war.[43]
The rise of Turkism, a political movement based on Turkish nation and not on a dynasty, religion or state, took place while feeding on the Ottoman reaction against Balkan separationism, the Tatar rebellions against Russian Panslavism, the new ideas brought forward by European nationalism, the works on Turcology, in a period where Ottomans were defeated and Muslims were humiliate.[44] Even if the Ottomanism ideology after the Balkan Wars and the Panturkism ideology after World War I could not become more than fantasies,[45] these ideological discussion which began in the 19th century carried on in a different perspective after World War I. The idea of “self-determination”, i.e., the principle that nations should choose their own fate, and the policies that Union and Progress pursued during the war and which foresaw ethnic reconstruction which covered not only non-Muslims but all nations of the empire[46] has given rise to discussions, but with one difference: Instead of the question “how to save the empire” was replaced with “how to institutionalize the state to replace the fallen empire”. The Turkish nationalism seen in this period developed in essence as a search for a Turkish Unity, as a reaction to the wishes of Greek and Armenian minorities to rid themselves of the Ottoman rule in 1919. On the other hand, it can be seen that the Ottomanism was brought into the agenda once more. There were ideas that criticized the Union and Progress’s Turkification policy, that stated that this policy weakened the link of Ottomanism and caused the Armenian and Greek minorities to put a distance between them and the state. They were thinking that the idea of Ottomanism should be reconstructed: Negative practices were conducted due to the wrong policies of the Union and Progress, but as these policies were now defunct, then the past might be forgot and the future might be reconstructed.[47] With these ideas in circulation, the boycott of the 1919 elections by the Greek and Armenian minorities, the ethnic based construction of Anatolia in the 1920 Sevres Treaty, caused the idea that the nations treacherous to the Empire should be discharged began to gain ground. The basis that the Turkish nation-state would rest on with the Lausanne Treaty would be Turkish Nationalism.[48]
Conclusion
How could the Ottoman Empire have been saved? That was the question all ideologies sought an answer for. Although each supplied different answers, one cannot say they had irreconcilable differences between them. There was no such thing as one cannot defend one of these ideological currents and couldn’t defend another. Many Young Turcs who defended Ottomanism, were at the same time practicing Muslims as well as romantic Panturkists who were deeply entrenched in nationalism.[49] A majority of the intellectuals were in favor of accepting those parts of the Western civilization they considered positive. Those who supported Ottomanism accepted that, so did Westernization supporters and so did even the Panislamists. The New Ottomans who aimed at unifying all the elements in the Empire under the Ottoman rule were on the one hand criticizing the Tanzimat reforms as a blind imitation of the West, and on the other hand, they were taking their point of origin from the values of the West. Panislamism which adopted Islamic practices and cooperation among the Muslim communities was defending a return to traditional values but was also using Western techniques. The Union and Progress were using a Western thesis to confront the West: nationalism. They, especially after 1913, favored Panturkism and put this ideology to the forefront in terms of war against Russia during World War I, were at ease in using Panislamist ideas at such times as the times they needed Arabian loyalty or as in their declaration of Jihad in 1914, when their political interests required it.[50] Ziya Gökalp, a prominent advocate of Turkism, argued that Western manners should be accepted, was also criticizing the Tanzimat reformers for their loss of contact with their own nation’s culture. The idea of Ottomanism tried to be revived during World War I became impossible with the Sevres Treaty and the idea of unification of all Turks became null and void in the wake of the Russian Revolution and the Turkish War of Independence. After this ideological confusions seen in the 19th and early 20th centuries, Modern Turkey which rose off the ashes of Ottoman Empire[51] was located on a far sounder and decisive ideology.
Mustafa Kemal opposed to the ideologies of Pan-Ottomanism, Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism. He was saying that Turks had deeds to do in Turkey, and adoption of any other policy would be nothing but adventure.[52] The new nationalism in the Republic of Turkey aimed at saving and elevating Anatolian Turks. Therefore, this nationalism was very different from nationalism of the Young Turk era. However, it won’t be wrong to say that the Young Turk nationalism was a means to awaken the Ottoman Turkish to the existence of a national conscience which was perceived far too late. Atatürk had two major aims: the establishment of a sovereign and independent Turkish state and this state’s modernization.[53] For these reasons, even during the War of Independence the link with the Sultan was broken, the sultanate was abolished on 1 November 1922 and the Caliphate on 3 March 1924. By these reforms, Atatürk wanted to establish a strong break from the past. His reforms constituted a coherent and systematic inclination towards the West and aimed at reaching the cultural, industrial, and economic level of the European states. Atatürk’s success derived from his belief to accept European civilization as a whole, whereas earlier reformers had only tried to imitate them with limited success.[54] Atatürk expressed his desire for westernization “to reach the level of contemporary civilizations”.[55] Western civilization was chosen “not for it is the civilization of the West, but because it represents the modern civilization which incorporates values created by entire humanity in thousands of years by adding an independent, scientific, and rationalist philosophy of life.”[56]
[1] For further information see; J. C. Hurewitz, “Ottoman Diplomacy and the European State System”, Middle East Journal, Vol. 15, 1961, pp. 145; T. Naff and R. Owen, “The Ottoman Empire and European State System”, in H. Bull and A. Watson, The Expansion of International Security, (Oxford, 1992), pp. 143-164.
[2] Suleyman the Magnificent’s letter to the French King begins as “I, the sultan of sultans, the distributor of rulers around the world, God’s shadow on Earth, the sultan and padishah of those lands my ancestors conquered with their swords including the Mediterranean, Black Sea, Thrace, Anatolia, land of Rome, of Damascus, Aleppo, Cairo, Mekka, Madina, Jerusalem… You, Francis, the king of France.”. Roderic Davison, Turkey, (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1968), p. 47.
[3] Ahmet Resmi, Sefaretname, (İstanbul, 1303), p. 33
[4] Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, (London, 1968), p. 42.
[5] Niyazi Berkes, Türkiye’de Çağdaşlaşma, Yapı Kredi Yayınları, İstanbul, 2004, p. 76.
[6] Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, “Some remarks on Ottoman Science and its Relation with European Science and Technology up to the End of the Eighteenth Century”, Journal of the Japan-Netherlands Institute. Proceedings of the International Congress on the Transfer of Science and Technology Between Europe and Asia Since Vasco de Gama, (1:5-7 Haziran 1991, Amsterdam), 3, (1991): 45:73.
[7] Permanent embassies were established at European capitals during the reign of Selim III. Again in this period, in education, such institutions as Mühendishane (Engineering School) where foreigners taught, were established. During the reign of Mahmut II, Military Medical School and Naval School were established and it was decided there would be lectures both in Turkish and in French there. For detailed information on the novelties of the reign of Selim III, see Enver Ziya Karal, Selim III’ün hatt-ı hümayunları, (Ankara: TTK Basımevi, 1999); and Karal, Osmanlı Tarihi, (Ankara: TTK Basımevi, 1988), pp. 13-73.
[8] Şaban Çalış, “The Origins of Modern Turkish Foreign Policy: Ottoman Psychological Background”, Foreign Policy, Vol. XXVII, No. 3-4, 2001, p. 59.
[9] In this subject, Stanford Shaw claims that Ottomans have not forced the Judeo-Christian populations of the lands they conquered neither to become slaves nor to convert to Islam. The troubles initiated by the Ottoman minorities in the 19th and the 20th centuries are the outcomes and proof of the Ottoman tolerance shown to them for five centuries. See Stanford Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, (Cambridge: 1977).
[10] In the Ottoman Empire, the millet system represents religious community. For further information about Ottoman “millet system” see; B. Eryılmaz, Osmanlı Devletinde Millet Sistemi, (İstanbul, 1992).
[11] İlber Ortaylı, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda Millet”, Tanzimattan Cumhuriyete Ansiklopedisi, (Ankara:1970), c. IV, p. 998.
[12] Kemal H. Karpat, Balkanlar’da Osmanlı Mirası ve Ulusçuluk, translated by Recep Boztemur, (Ankara: İmge Yayınları, 2004), p. 14.
[13] Had the Ottomans, as some prejudiced scholars argue, pressurised the minorities and forced them to convert, possibly such troubles would not have taken place in the 19th century. Even though there were some restrictions on the Non-Muslims, these worked on their benefit, not against them. For detailed information on the situation of Non-Muslims in the Ottoman Empire, see Yelda Demirağ, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda Yaşayan Azınlıkların Sosyal ve Ekonomik Durumları”, OTAM sayı: 13, ayrıbasım, (Ankara. AÜ Basımevi, 2003), p. 15-33; Benjamin Lewis Braude, Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire, (New York: 1982); Yavuz Ercan, “Türkiye’de XV. Ve XVI. Yüzyıllarda Gayrimüslimlerin Hukuki, İçtimai ve İktisadi Durumu”, Belleten Dergisi, cilt: XLVII, 1983, p.1143; Charles Issawı, “The Transformation of the Economic Position of the Millets in the 19th Century”, Bernard Lewis- Benjamin Braude (Ed.), Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire, (New York:1982), volume 2, p. 261.
[14] E. Mortimer, Faith and Power: The Politics of Islam, (London:1982), pp. 126-128.
[15] For the reforms in the reign of Mahmut II, see Uriel Heyd, “The Ottoman Ulema and Westernization in the Time of Selim III and Mahmud II”, Scripta Hierosolymitana, Vol. IX, Studies in Islamic History and Civilization, (Jerusalem: 1961), p. 63-96; Avigdor Levy, “The Ottoman Ulema and the Military Reforms of Sultan Mahmud II”, Asian and African Studies, Vol.7, 1971, p. 13-40.
[16] Enver Ziya Karal, Osmanlı Tarihi, (Ankara: TTK Basımevi, 1989), C:V, p. 171.
[17] On reactions to Tanzimat, see Engelhardt, La Turquie et le Tanzimat ou Histoire des Reformes dans L’Empire Ottoman, (Paris: 1882), Cevdet Paşa, Tezakir, Yayınlayan: Cavid Baysun, (Ankara: TTK Basımevi, 1991); Roderic Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire 1956-1976, (Princeton: 1963); Halil İnalcık, “Tanzimatın Uygulanması ve Sosyal Tepkileri”, Belleten Dergisi, 1983, C. 20, p. 43.
[18] Erik Jan Zürcher, Modernleşen Türkiye’nin Tarihi, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 1999.
[19] Şaban Çalış, “The Origins of Modern Turkish Foreign Policy: Ottoman Psychological Background”, Foreign Policy, Vol. XXVII, No. 3-4, 2001, p.
[20] Şükrü Hanioğlu, Osmanlıcılık, Tanzimattan Cumhuriyete Türkiye Ansiklopedisi, p. 1390.
[21] Türköne, İslamcılığın Doğuşu, pp. 25.
[22] Şerif Mardin, “19. yy’da Düşünce Akımları ve Osmanlı Devleti”, Tanzimattan Cumhuriyete p. 348. In this subject, Niyazi Berkes thinks differently and argues that the Pan-Islamism of Abdülhamit II is neither a reaction to Pan-Slavism nor a dream of uniting all the Muslims of the World. Pan Islamism of Abdülhamit who was a realist politician is an ideology against the Arabian sheiks, against the mehdis, the hidivs of Egypt, and the separatist movements in Egypt, Syria, and Yemen. Niyazi Berkes, Türkiye’de Çağdaşlaşma, p. 364.
[23] Şaban Çalış, also see. Mortimer, Faith and Power, p. 80.
[24] Renée Worringer, “Sick Man of Europe or Japan of the Near East?; Contructing Ottoman Modernity in the Hamidian and Young Turk Eras”, International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, No.36, 2004, pp. 207-230.
[25] Şükrü Hanioğlu, “Batıcılık”, Tanzimattan Cumhuriyete Türkiye Ansiklopedisi, p. 1383.
[26] Tunaya, Garpçılık, p. 594.
[27] İçtihat, no: 89 (Hicri 1329), p. 1890. Mentioned in Tarık Zafer Tunaya, “Garpçılık”, p. 590.
[28] Sina Akşin, Türk Ulusçuluğu, Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi, p. 1943.
[29] Gencay Şaylan, “Milliyetçilik, İdeoloji ve Türk Milliyetçiliği”, Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi. The reason for these researches was to know the foreigners as well as their own people. In this subject, research on hsitory, language, and philosophy were started.
[30] S. A. Zenkovsky, Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960).
[31] François Georgeon, Türk Milliyetçiliğinin Kökenleri: Yusuf Akçura, (Çev. Alev Er), (Ankara:Yurt Yayınları, 1986).
[32] Francois Georgeon, op. cit.., p. 47.
[33] Bernard Lewis, op. cit., p. 329-330.
[34] François Georgeon,op. cit.., p. 17.
[35] Nadir Devlet, İsmail Bey (Gaspıralı), (Ankara: Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı, 1988).
[36] Akçura and Gasprinski share the same opinions on many subjects. Their difference stems from the priority they give to Islam and Turkhood. For Gaprinski Islam ranked first while for Akçura, as he states in the Üç Tarzı Siyaset, Turkish nationalism was superior to Islam Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset, p. 50. For further information see, David Thomas, “Yusuf Akçura and the Intellectual Origins of Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset”, Journal of Turkish Studies, 2:1978, pp. 127-140.
[37] Masami Arai, Jön Türk Dönemi Türk Milliyetçiliği, Çev.Tansel Demirel, (İstanbul:İletişim Yayınları, 1994).
[38] Tevfik Çavdar, İttihat ve Terakki, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1994).
[39] Jacob M. Landau, “Kültürel ve Siyasi Pantürkizm”, Osmanlı Ansiklopedisi, cilt 7, p. 493.
[40] For further information on Pan-Turkist organisations and their publications, see Masami Arai, “Between State and Nation: A New Light on the Journal Turk”, Turcica (Paris), 24: 1992, pp 277-295.
[41] The date of establishment of the organisation is 6 January 1909. Fethi Tevetoğlu, Müftüoğlu Ahmet Hikmet, (Ankara:1986), p. 80.
[42] Yusuf Akçuraoğlu, Türk Yılı: 1928, İstanbul, 1928, p. 435.
[43] The cited agreement is concluded by Sadrazam Halit Paşa, Enver Paşa, Talat Paşa, and the head of the Meclis-i Mebusan Halil on 2 August 1914 at the personal residence of Sait Halim Paşa on the Bosphorus. The most important article of the agreement foresees that if Russia enters the conflict and Germany is also forced to enter the fray, then Ottoman Empire would become part of the Axis powers. Eric Jan Zürcher, op. cit., p. 165-166.
[44] Bernard. Lewis, op. cit., p. 346.
[45] Jacob M. Landau, “The Fortunes and Misfortunes of Pan-Turkism”, Central Asian Survey, 7 (1): 1988, pp. 1-5.
[46] Fuat Dündar, İttihat ve Terakki’nin Müslümanları İskan Politikası (1913-1918), (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001).
[47] Nesim Şeker, “Türklük ve Osmanlı Arasında: Birinci Dünya Savaşı Sonrası Türkiye’de “Milliyet” Arayışları ya da “Anasır Meselesi”, Erik Jan Zürcher (der.), İmparatorluktan Cumhuriyete Türkiye’de Etnik Çatışma, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2005), pp. 157-175.
[48] Nesim Şeker, 2005, p.168.
[49] Eric Zürcher, 1999, p. 187.
[50] G. L. Lewis, “The Ottoman Proclamation of Jihad in 1914”, Islamic Quarterly: A Review of Islamic Culture , 19 (1-2), 1975, pp. 157-163.
[51] Oral Sander, Anka’nın Yükselişi ve Düşüşü, (Ankara: 1993).
[52] Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Söylev I, p. 193.
[53] For further informaton on Atatürk’s Western orientation in his thoughts, see Mehmet Gönlübol, Atatürk’s Foreign Policy: Goals and Principles, içinden: Feyzioglu, Turhan (der.), Atatürk’s Way, (İstanbul :1982), p. 255-302.
[54] See, Baskın Oran, Az Gelişmiş Ülke Milliyetçiliği , (Ankara: 1997), pp. 28.
[55] İlhan Selçuk, “Avrupa’ya Anadolu’dan Girilir”, Cumhuriyet, 14/11/1997.
[56] Afet İnan, Mustafa. Kemal Atatürk’ten Yazdıklarım, (Ankara: 1971), p. 37.
